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Abstract: Given the importance of trust, exploring what may affect trust then becomes attractive. 
The main purpose of this paper is to explain general trust quantitatively. This paper from, but not 
limited to, a perspective of original institutional economics elaborates what may affect general 
trust and proposes three reasonable hypotheses first, and then uses CGSS 2013 dataset to execute 
ordered logit regression of general trust on some selected variables. It is found that taken 
advantage has a strongly significant negative impact on general trust; fairness, moral satisfaction, 
opinion similarity, leisure time for rest and leisure time for learning have strongly significant 
positive impacts on general trust; public security problem, however, has a negative but not 
significant impact on general trust. These core explanatory variables improve predictive capability 
by 4 percent. This paper also compares general trust and trust in strangers, and regress trust in 
strangers on the same independent variables of general trust. There are two main differences: the 
first is that the negative impact of public security problem gets significant for trust in strangers; 
the second is that the significant impact of leisure time for resting gets negative for trust in 
strangers.  
Keywords: general trust, trust in strangers, original institutional economics, fairness, morality, 
opinion, public security, leisure time 
Introduction 
A question that institutional economists are continuously paying close attention to is whence 
economic growth comes. (e.g., Kapp, 2011, p.34) Tradition of original institutional economics 
treats economy as a part of society and culture. (e.g., Veblen, [1899] 2005; Kapp, 2011, p. 17) ―[…] 
Myrdal (1944) […] found that economic analysis can only become complete when embedded in 
the wider social context.‖ (Elsner et al., 2015, Chapter 12, p. 342) Sociologist Granovetter (1985) 
also argues that economic behaviors are embedded in society. (Granovetter, 1985) So far, the 
impact of (general) trust on economic performance has been largely discussed. (e.g., Knack and 
Keefer, 1997; Bohnet and Huck, 2004; Paldam, 2009 in Svendsen and Svendsen, 2009; Algan and 
Cahuc, 2010;  Peiró-Palomino and Tortosa-Ausina, 2013; Daniele and Geys, 2015) Generally 
speaking, most empirical research holds that trust has a significant positive influence on economic 
performance. Trust is an indispensible ingredient in socio-economic life. It is hard to imagine how 
tough life would be without basic interpersonal trust. Given the importance of trust, exploring 
what may affect trust then becomes attractive. This is not only the requirement for understanding 
the formation of trust, but also the center piece of the policy implication for trust (re)building and 
accumulation of social capital, since trust itself is not an operable concept. So far, as Delhey and 
Newton (2003) summarize, there already exist six theories of the origins of social trust. (Delhey 
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and Newton, 2003) Empirical research digging into the determinants of trust has also emerged in 
social science. For example, research of Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) reveals that individual 
experiences and community characteristics affect general trust. (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). 
Blanco and Ruiz (2013) provide empirical evidence that insecurity has a significant negative effect 
on trust in others in Colombia. (Blanco and Ruiz, 2013) However, endowing general trust with an 
evolutionary-institutional theoretical background is not much. (Exceptions inc. e.g., Elsner and 
Schwardt, 2014, 2015) 
The main task of this paper is to quantitatively explain general trust starting from a perspective of 
original institutional economics using Chinese General Social Survey 2013 data. The rest of this 
paper contains 5 sections: Section 1 provides an institutional way of thinking about general trust 
and proposes three hypotheses for what may affect general trust; Section 2 introduces the data set 
used for econometric analysis later and presents statistical description of variables used; Section 3 
gives econometric model, and presents and analyzes results; Section 4 is a discussion on general 
trust and trust in strangers; Section 5 concludes.  
1 Theoretical background and hypotheses 
―General trust‖ is individuals‘ general trust from the view of the standard question on general trust, 
i.e., ―generally speaking, would you say most people can be trusted‖ or some question similar, 
which can be found in various micro surveys, such as World Values Survey, European Social 
Survey, European Values Study, Chinese General Social Survey and so on. Therefore, in order to 
explore and test the influencing factors of general trust quantitatively, it would be helpful to 
consider via individuals and from inner feelings what may affect general trust since general trust 
cannot change without reasons and after all general trust dwells on psychological layer. The 
change of inner feelings about others‘ untrustworthy behaviors, such as aversions, disappointment, 
depression, anger, fear and so forth, may contribute a great deal to the change of general trust, 
which constructs, if it can be said like this, as the emotional foundation of general trust because 
humans are essentially social beings.  
Humans are biological and, at the same time, social beings – this is also why Kapp (2011) prefers 
to call humans homo institutionalis, rather than homo oeconomicus. (Kapp, 2011, p. 66) Thus, a 
society is a society of individuals with institutional traits, and the interactions of individuals are 
embedded in interweaved institutions. We humans acquire (learn) institutional traits from our 
ancestors, our sages, and our early generations, and pass them to our later generations. In a word 
briefly, intergenerational transition of institutional traits is a precondition of institutional 
consecution and persistence.  
Then, what are institutions? In his seminal monograph The Theory of the Leisure Class: An 
Economic Study of Institutions, Veblen ([1899] 2005) deems that ―(t)he institutions are, in 
substance, prevalent habits of thought with respect to particular relations and particular functions 
of the individual and of the community‖ (Veblen, [1899] 2005, Chapter 8, p. 143-144) These 
habits of thoughts not merely guide individuals‘ behavior, but also direct in which way individuals 
think others should behave. Veblen ([1899] 2005) ever states that ―(t)he evolution of society is 
substantially a process of mental adaptation on the part of individuals under the stress of 
circumstances which will no longer tolerate habits of thought formed under and conforming to a 
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different set of circumstances in the past‖ (Veblen, [1899] 2005, Chapter 8, p. 145). As the other 
side of the same coin, others‘ breaching habits of thought or norms of behavior leads to an 
individual‘s mental inadaptation, and at the same time causes aversion and damages general trust. 
What it boils down to is the interdependence of human behavior. Over an accumulation, 
sedimentation and evolution of hundreds and thousands of years, various norms of behavior have 
already permeated our daily life. Among those that people highly praise is fairness, truthfulness, 
keeping one‘s promise and so on and so forth, as well as morals.  
The criticism of original institutional economics on neoclassical economics always involves the 
philosophical foundation of economics. Kapp (2011) criticizes neoclassical economics based on 
utilitarianism from Jeremy Bentham (Kapp, 2011, p. 19-20) of being ―without explicit normative 
or moral values premises‖ (Kapp, 2011, p. 21). Humans are not pleasure machines (Hodgson, 
2013); we have ―moralische Gesetz in mir‖
1
 (Kant, [1788] 1968, p. 161). Original institutional 
economics (namely evolutionary institutional economics) inherits its philosophical foundation 
from American pragmatic philosophy which is founded and developed by Charles Peirce, William 
James and John Dewey. Dewey (1922) argues that ―morals […] is ineradicably empirical‖ (Dewey, 
1922, p. 295) and that ―(m)orals means growth of conduct in meaning‖ (Dewey, 1922, p. 280).  
―China is a society of ethics standard.‖
2
 (Liang, [1949] 2005, Chapter 5, p. 70) Trustworthiness, 
truthfulness and other associated qualities as a moral norm appears in as early as Confucian 
classics of pre-Qin
3
 philosophy in China, i.e. Lun Yu (namely The Confucian Analects) of 
Confucius and his disciples. For several examples, ―Confucius remarked, ‗I do not know how men 
get along without good faith. A cart without a yoke and a carriage without harness, - how could 
they go?‘ ‖
4
 (Confucius and his disciples, translated by Ku, 1898, p. 12) ―[…] ‗My aim,‘ replied 
Confucius, ‗would be to be a comfort to my old folk at home; to be sincere, and to be found 
trustworthy by my friends; and to love and care for my young people at home.‘‖
5
 (Confucius and 
his disciples, translated by Ku, 1898, p. 37) ―Confucius through his life and teaching taught only 
four thins: a knowledge of literature and the arts, conduct, conscientiousness and truthfulness.‖
6
 
(Confucius and his disciples, translated by Ku, 1898, p. 54)  
What is important for trust to change is the information that derives from interactions about 
whether others are conforming to norms of conduct. More deeply, it is the nature of events 
(namely, trust-increasing or trust decreasing) that decides the direction of the change of general 
trust. In general, there are two ways of acquiring others‘ information about whether or not they are 
                                                             
1 In one of his insightful and far-reaching three critiques, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (i.e. Critique of Practical 
Reason), Kant (1788) wrote in German that ―Zwei Dinge erfüllen das Gemüt mit immer neuer und zunehmender 
Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht, je öfter und anhaltender sich das Nachdenken damit beschäftigt: Der bestirnte 
Himmel über mir, und das moralische Gesetz in mir.‖ (Kant, [1788] 1968, p. 161) Translated into English is ―Two 
thins fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more frequently and persistently 
one‘s meditation deals with them: the starry sky above me and the moral law within me.‖ (Translated by Pluhar, 
2002, p. 203) It should be noted that Kant and Dewey hold quite different views on morals. (see Kant, [1785] 2002; 
Kant, [1788] 2002; Dewey, 1922) However, I will not elaborate on them here.  
2 Author‘s own translation. The original text in Chinese is ―中国是伦理本位的社会‖. (Liang, [1949] 2005, 
Chapter 5, p. 70) 
3 Qin (秦) (221BCE ~207BCE) is a dynasty in Chinese history.  
4 The original text in Chinese is ―子曰：‗人而无信，不知其可也。大车无輗，小车无軏，其何以行之哉？‘‖ ——
《论语》 
5 The original text in Chinese is ―子曰：‗老者安之，朋友信之，少者怀之。‘‖——《论语》 
6 The original text is Chinese is ―子以四教：文、行、忠、信。‖——《论语》 
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conforming to norms of conduct: one is via personal interactions, the other is via non-interaction 
methods, such as observing, word by mouth, media using and so on. Contrast to experiences of 
direct interaction, feelings from acquiring others‘ interaction information via non-interaction 
methods relate to what Smith (1759) calls sympathy in his The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith, 
[1759] 1966). We image what we would feel if we were one of the interacting parties. Therefore, 
the first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: Given other conditions, others‘ behavior of violating norms of conduct has a 
negative impact on general trust. The severer others‘ behavior of breaching norms of conduct, the 
more damage there is to general trust. 
If the foregoing can be categorized into about incompatibility of habits of thought vs. behavior, 
then the forthcoming will be about discord of thought vs. thought.  
It is a noteworthy phenomenon that a piece of social news often arouses netizens‘ widely and 
furious debate in social media nowadays. What they actually focus on is more than the social 
affair itself. More precisely, a piece of news reported merely provides an opportunity time-point 
when people can express their own opinions on all similar events. Further deeply, they are 
expressing their own value views orientation.  
Admittedly, personal values highly relate to his cultural background (here, just call it common 
values), but they do not perfectly coincide. What is more, due to different angles and depth of 
commenting on an event, people may accentuate different criteria of value judgment while at the 
same time it is hard to tell any criteria involved is essentially and admittedly wrong in every 
possible sense since it may be reasonable to some extent. Expressing opinions is a process of 
externalization of values through language or communication. People compare others‘ opinions 
with those of themselves. Dewey (1922) ever states that ―(d)iversity does not of itself imply 
conflict, but it implies the possibility of conflict, and this possibility is realized in fact.‖ (Dewey 
1922, p. 52) By the same token, difference of opinion does not definitely lead to decrease of 
general trust, but it is possible. Therefore, the second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2: Given other conditions, discord of opinions has a negative impact on general trust. 
The larger the degree of the discord of opinion, the more damage there is to general trust. 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 both relate to information about interactions through either direct personal 
interactions or indirect non-personal interactions. It is conceivable that time or efforts devoted into 
acquiring this kind of information provide chances that general trust may change. Put another way, 
out of his personal habits or disposition, how much time one does not contribute to acquiring 
information delivered from interactions may have an impact on general trust. 
However, to interact or not to interact can both increase general trust. On one hand, when people 
have social activities, they more likely choose those with whom they like to interact, those with 
whom they often have a rapport, share similar interest and opinion, and do not behave 
untrustworthily to them. From this standpoint, social activities can sustain general trust - this is a 
positive consequence from peer selection. On the other hand, those who do not interact often or do 
not pay much attention to information of others‘ interactions can also have high general trust 
because their personal disposition or habits of not interacting with others prohibits information 
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sources delivering untrustworthy affairs happening in society, and then they do not know much 
about those untrustworthy affairs in society. Thus, general trust may be stable and probability be 
kept high. Since hypothesis 1 and 2 have already caught the impact of information about 
interactions (thought - behavior interaction and thought – thought interaction), what will be 
investigated is the latter, namely the impact of not to interact. Therefore, the third hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3: Given other conditions, time not being paid to acquiring information about 
interactions has an impact on general trust. The more time one spends not to interact, the higher 
his general trust. 
In a short summary, what may affect general trust is considered from three aspects: a) response to 
others‘ behavior; b) response to others‘ opinion; c) no information. Also see Figure 1. 
Gao,Lin-2017-Trust empirical China 
6 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1. Mechanism of general trust change.
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2 Data and descriptive statistics 
Data used in this paper is from Chinese General Social Survey 2013 (CGSS 2013). ―CGSS is the 
first nation-wide, comprehensive and continuous social survey program in China.‖
1
 (CGSS, 2013, 
Questionnaire B) CGSS has been conducted in China since 2003. (CGSS, 2013, Questionnaire B. 
For more information about CGSS, also see, e.g., Bian and Li, 2012) CGSS 2013 contains two 
questionnaires, Questionnaire A and Questionnaire B, which comprise not all the same questions. 
Questionnaire A contains four sections, section A, B, C and Z, while Questionnaire B contains 
section A, B, D and Z. What is used in this paper is CGSS 2013 Questionnaire B, since one 
variable of interest is from section D of Questionnaire B but is not included in Questionnaire A. 
(For a glance at the questions used in this paper, see Appendix A) Both CGSS 2013 Questionnaire 
A and CGSS 2013 Questionnaire B are in the same dataset. CGSS 2013 dataset contains 11438 
observations in total, within 5772 observations for CGSS 2013 Questionnaire A and 5666 
observations for CGSS 2013 Questionnaire B. From CGSS 2013 Questionnaire B, taken 
advantage, fairness, moral satisfaction and public security problem are chosen for hypothesis 1, 
opinion similarity is chosen for hypothesis 2, and leisure time for rest and leisure time for learning 
are for hypothesis 3, besides other two dependent variables and seven control variables.
2
 When 
measuring time of no interaction information, the proxy / proxies are chosen to reflect that 
non-interaction is of an individual‘s own accord in order to avoid the endogenous problem of 
reverse causality in econometric model. After deleting observations with missing values, 5203 
observations, about 92% observations, are left for further analysis. Table 1 presents descriptive 
statistics for variables used in this paper. Therein, age is got by subtracting 2013, the survey year, 
from the birth year. and mandarin level is measured by the average score of mandarin listening 
and mandarin speaking in order to unity measurement standard with other five-point Likert type 
items. It can be seen that most of the variables used are Likert type items. Additionally, moral 
satisfaction is reverse scored since in the questionnaire, relatively high moral satisfaction was 
valued a relatively low score. The rest variables are presented as they are.
                                                             
1 Author‘s own translation.  
2 Two dependent variables are general trust and trust in strangers, respectively. General trust is the dependent 
variable in the econometric analysis in Section 3 in this paper, while trust in strangers is the dependent variable in 
the econometric analysis in Section 4 in this paper.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics. 
Variables Descriptive statistics 
Dependent variables   
General trust (A33; a33)   
    Strongly disagree (=1) 200 
    Disagree (=2) 1304 
    Neither (=3) 845 
    Agree (=4) 2577 
    Strongly agree (=5) 277 
    Min 1.000 
    1st quantile  2.000  
    Median 4.000 
    Mean 3.274 
    3rd quantile 4.000 
    Max 5.000 
Core explanatory variables   
Taken advantage (A34; a34)   
    Strongly disagree (=1) 228 
    Disagree (=2) 1603 
    Neither (=3) 1205 
    Agree (=4) 1960 
    Strongly agree (=5) 207 
    Min 1.000 
    1st quantile 2.000 
    Median 3.000 
    Mean 2.915 
    3rd quantile 4.000 
    Max 5.000 
Fairness (A35; a35)   
    Completely unfair (=1) 384 
    Unfair (=2) 1529 
    Neither (=3) 1174 
    Fair (=4) 1980 
    Completely fair (=5) 136 
    Min 1.000 
    1st quantile 2.000 
    Median 3.000 
    Mean 2.991 
    3rd quantile 4.000 
    Max 5.000 
Moral Satisfaction (D1; d1)   
    Very dissatisfied (=1) 197 
    Dissatisfied (=2) 1004 
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    Neither (=3) 2179 
    Satisfied (=4) 1725 
    Very satisfied (=5) 98 
    Min 1.000 
    1st quantile 3.000 
    Median 3.000 
    Mean 3.101 
    3rd quantile 4.000 
    Max 5.000 
Public security problem (B10; b101, b102, b103)   
    First problem to be settled = Public Security Problem 238 
    Second problem to be settled = Public Security Problem 395 
    Third problem to be settled = Public Security Problem 534 
    sum 1167 
Opinion similarity (B4; b4)   
    Very rarely (=1) 39 
    Rarely (=2) 513 
    Average (=3) 1903 
    Frequently (=4) 2500 
    Very frequently (=5) 248 
    Min 1.000 
    1st quantile 3.000 
    Median 4.000 
    Mean 3.462 
    3rd quantile 4.000 
    Max 5.000 
Leisure time - Rest / Relax (A31; a312)   
    Never (=1) 131 
    Seldom (=2) 804 
    Sometimes (=3) 1813 
    Often (=4) 2096 
    Very frequently (=5) 359 
    Min 1.000 
    1st quantile 3.000 
    Median 3.000 
    Mean 3.336 
    3rd quantile 4.000 
    Max 5.000 
Leisure time - Learn (A31; a313)   
    Never (=1) 2415 
    Seldom (=2) 1440 
    Sometimes (=3) 809 
    Often (=4) 439 
    Very frequently (=5) 100 
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    Min 1.000 
    1st quantile 1.000 
    Median 2.000 
    Mean 1.918 
    3rd quantile 3.000 
    Max 5.000 
Control variables   
Gender (A2 / a2)   
    Male  2640 
    Female 2563 
Age (A3; 2013 - a3a)   
    Age group 1 [18, 33) 1063 
    Age group 2 [33, 48) 1574 
    Age group 3 [48, 64) 1624 
    Age group 4 [64, 96] 942 
    Min 18.00 
    1st quantile 35.00 
    Median 47.00 
    Mean 47.75 
    3rd quantile 60.00 
    Max 96.00 
Subjective social class - 14 years old (A43d; a43d)   
    Min 1.000 
    1st quantile 2.000 
    Median 3.000 
    Mean 3.108 
    3rd quantile 4.000 
    Max 10.000 
Current highest education    
    ≤ Elementary education 2020 
    Elementary education 1061 
    Secondary education 2575 
    Tertiary education 903 
Mandarin level (A49,A50; (a49+a50)/2 )   
    Min 1.000 
    1st quantile 3.000 
    Median 3.500 
    Mean 3.493 
    3rd quantile 4.000 
    Max 5.000 
Happiness (A36; a36)   
    Very unhappy (=1) 76 
    Unhappy (=2) 377 
    Neither (=3) 995 
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    Happy (=4) 3058 
    Very happy (=5) 697 
    Min 1.000 
    1st quantile 3.000 
    Median 4.000 
    Mean 3.754 
    3rd quantile 4.000 
    Max 5.000 
Precepts ―choice phobia‖ (B3; b3)   
    Strongly disagree (=1) 232 
    Disagree (=2) 1510 
    Fairly (=3) 2408 
    Agree (=4) 959 
    Strongly agree (=5) 94 
    Min 1.000 
    1st quantile 2.000 
    Median 3.000 
    Mean 2.841 
    3rd quantile 3.000 
    Max 5.000 
Sample size 5203 
Note: Author‘s own calculation using R. (R Core Team, 2017) Data source: CGSS 2013. CGSS 
2013 Questionnaire B has 5666 observations in total. 5203 observations are left after deleting 
missing values. What is before the semicolon in every parenthesis after each variable in Table 1 is 
the question number in CGSS 2013 Questionnaire B; what is after the semicolon is the variable 
name in original CGSS 2013 dataset (or how a new generated variable in Table 1 is calculated via 
the variable in original CGSS 2013 dataset). For original questions in questionnaire, see Appendix 
A. The CGSS 2013 data is of Stata format. R package foreign (R Core Team, 2016) can be used to 
import Stata format data into R for data analysis.  
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3 Econometric model and results 
3.1 Econometric model 
Considering the intrinsic ordered nature of the dependent variable GeneralTrust, ordered logit 
regression is adopted for econometric analysis to explore causality.
1
 The ordered logit model with 
main effects is set as below
2
:  
logit 𝑃 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 ≤ 𝑗  
= −(𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽4𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛 + 𝑿𝜸)                                 (𝑗 = 1, 2, 3, 4) 
𝛼𝒋 (j = 1,2,3,4) are intercepts. X is a matrix of which the columns are control variables. 𝜸 is 
coefficient vector for control variables. Control variables are respectively a gender dummy 
(female=1, male=0), 3 age-group dummies (age group 2 = 1, otherwise = 0; age group 3 = 1, 
otherwise = 0; age group 4 = 1, otherwise = 0), 3 current-highest-education dummies (Elementary 
education = 1, otherwise = 0; Secondary education = 1, otherwise = 0; Tertiary education = 1, 
otherwise = 0), subjective social class at 14 years old, happiness, mandarin level and precepts 
―choice phobia‖. Therein, subjective social class at 14 years old is controlled as a proxy of the 
effects of family of origin. Happiness is controlled as a proxy of current life status. Precepts 
―choice phobia‖ reflects personality to some degree. Additionally, being independent variables 
(either core explanatory variables or control variables), almost all five-point Likert type items are 
treated as single predictors in order to avoid information loss and/or difficulty in explanation, 
despite some debates about Likert data.
3
  
3.2 Pearson correlation matrix 
Before econometric analysis is implemented, Pearson correlation matrix of most independent 
variables are presented in Table 2 to detect the pair-wise linear relations between them.
4
 From 
Table 2, the absolute value of each correlation coefficient is below 0.4. The strongest linear 
correlation is between fairness and moral satisfaction (about 0.32), the second strongest is between 
fairness and happiness (about 0.29). Hence, no strong linear correlation exists between any two 
independent variables shown in Table 2.
                                                             
1 For more knowledge about analysis of ordinal categorical data, see e.g., Agresti, 2010, 2nd edition. 
2 The signs on the right hand side of the model are adapted according to the latent model estimated latter using the 
R-package VGAM (Yee, 2017), a package which is used for economic analysis in this paper, in order for my 
model and the results outputted by VGAM to be consistent in explanation. 
3 For more discussion about whether parametric statistics can be used with Likert type items, see, e.g., Norman, 
2010. Norman (2010) argues that ―(p)arametric statistics can be used with Likert data, with small sample sizes, 
with unequal variances, and with non-normal distributions‖. (Norman, 2010, pp. 631) In the area of economics, 
Likert type item is also treated as a single independent variable in top journals. For example, Blanco and Ruiz 
(2013) use insecurity which is a scale type item as a single explanatory variable. (Blanco and Ruiz, 2013) 
4 Since Pearson‘s r is robust to non-normality and ordinal data (Norman, 2010), it is adopted to measure the 
relationship between these variables, rather than using Spearman‘s rho or Kendall‘s tau b.  
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Table 2. Pearson correlation coefficients matrix 
  Taken advantage Fairness Moral satisfaction Opinion similarity 
Taken advantage 1 -0.11946266 -0.11455167 -0.079707911 
Fairness -0.11946266 1 0.32214294 0.081344328 
Moral satisfaction -0.11455167 0.32214294 1 0.083766089 
Opinion similarity -0.07970791 0.08134433 0.08376609 1 
Leisure time - Rest -0.05744164 0.02621836 -0.01470889 0.078130124 
Leisure time - Learn -0.00412774 -0.02531845 -0.10046645 0.006356659 
Happiness -0.11046841 0.28837692 0.12497735 0.128420486 
Precepts "choice phobia" 0.06293303 -0.03638754 0.02244971 -0.017325233 
  Leisure time - Rest Leisure time - Learn Happiness Precepts ―choice phobia‖ 
Taken advantage -0.05744164 -0.00412774 -0.11046841 0.06293303 
Fairness 0.02621836 -0.025318454 0.28837692 -0.03638754 
Moral satisfaction -0.01470889 -0.100466449 0.12497735 0.02244971 
Opinion similarity 0.07813012 0.006356659 0.12842049 -0.01732523 
Leisure time - Rest 1 0.13242894 0.08271958 -0.01474469 
Leisure time - Learn 0.13242894 1 0.07437726 -0.08584193 
Happiness 0.08271958 0.074377259 1 -0.04617063 
Precepts ―choice phobia‖ -0.01474469 -0.085841929 -0.04617063 1 
Note: Author‘s own calculation using R. (R Core Team, 2017) Data source: CGSS 2013 
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3.3 Results 
Three models of ordered logit regression of general trust are implemented: 1) null model which 
only regresses on intercepts; 2) control model which regresses on both intercepts and control 
variables; and 3) full model which contains core explanatory variables besides intercepts and 
control variables. Results are integrated in Table 3 and the sample regression function of the full 
model is below: 
logit 𝑃 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 ≤ 𝑗  
= −(𝛼𝑗 − 0.25𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 0.55𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 0.24𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
− 0.05𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚 + 0.26𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 0.16𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 0.10𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛 − 0.11𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒
+ 0.26𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑇𝑤𝑜 + 0.46𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒 + 0.48𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑟
− 0.07𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑛− 0.07𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑑𝑢𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦
− 0.16𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦 − 0.06𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦
+ 0.07𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛 + 0.20𝐻𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 0.11𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑃ℎ𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑎)    (𝑗
= 1, 2, 3, 4; 𝛼1 = −0.89, 𝛼2 = −3.42; 𝛼3 = −4.25; 𝛼4 = −7.70) 
Significance of control variables From Table 3, gender as female has significant negative impact 
on general trust compared with males, both in control model and in full model, while in the letter 
this negative impact gets more significant. Age has strongly significant positive impact on general 
trust, which is consistent with other research. Social class at 14 years old shows much stronger 
significant negative impact on general trust in the full model than in the control model. What is 
surprising is that current highest education, in general, does not show significant positive impact 
on general trust both in the control model and in the full model, which contrasts with much of 
other research. On the contrary, education here has a negative, but not significant in general 
(besides highest education is secondary education), impact on general trust. Mandarin level has a 
positive impact on general trust and this impact is more significant in the full model than in the 
control model. Precepts ―choice phobia‖ has a positive impact on general trust and this impact is 
much more significant in the full model than in the control model. 
Significance of core explanatory variables From Table 3, consistent with expectation, taken 
advantage has a strongly significant negative impact on general trust, and fairness, moral 
satisfaction, opinion similarity, leisure time for rest and leisure time for learning all have strongly 
significant positive impact on general trust. What is surprising is that even though public security 
problem has a negative impact on general trust, this impact is however not significant even at 
significance level of 0.1. 
Log odds of core explanatory variables Among the seven core explanatory variables, fairness has 
the biggest influence on odds holding other variables constant. Given a particular level of general 
trust, the log odds of the probability higher than or equal to this particular level against the 
probability lower than this particular level increases 0.73 when fairness increases one unit 
(improves one level). (See exponentiated estimate in Table 3) Then come opinion similarity, moral 
satisfaction, leisure time for rest and leisure time for learning which improve log odds by 0.29, 
0.27, 0.18 and 0.11, respectively. In contrast, public security problem and taken advantage 
decrease odds by 0.05 and 0.21, respectively. That is more, the full model improves predictive 
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capability by about 4 percentage compared with the control model.  
Likelihood ratio test After testing significance of single independent variables (Table 3), 
likelihood ratio tests are implemented for null model vs. control model, null model vs. full model, 
and control model vs. full model respectively in order to see the significance of the whole model. 
(See Table 4) The three tests are all significant at significance level of 0.001. This also indicates 
that the whole model holds.  
Gao,Lin-2017-Trust empirical China 
16 
 
Table 3: Ordered logit regression (Dependent variable: general trust) 
  Null model 
Estimate 
(Std. Error) 
Control model Full model 
  
Estimate 
(Std. Error) 
Exponentiated 
estimate 
Estimate 
(Std. Error) 
Exponentiated 
estimate 
Intercepts 
     
    Intercept 1 
3.21948 **** 
(0.07211) 
1.27136 **** 
(0.21627)  
-0.89385 *** 
(0.29352)  
    Intercept 2 
0.89993 **** 
(0.03058) 
-1.09674 **** 
(0.20922)  
-3.42395 **** 
(0.29151)  
    Intercept 3 
0.19473 **** 
(0.02786) 
-1.83265 **** 
(0.21020)  
-4.24753 **** 
(0.29352)  
    Intercept 4 
-2.87827 **** 
(0.06175) 
-5.00599 **** 
(0.22190)  
-7.69174 **** 
(0.30842)  
Core explanatory variables 
     
    Taken advantage 
   
-0.25446 ****  
(0.02937) 
0.7753382 
    Fairness 
   
0.54733 **** 
(0.02929) 
1.7286241 
    Moral satisfaction 
   
0.24087 **** 
(0.03338) 
1.2723611 
    Public security problem (=0, reference) 
   
--- --- 
    Public security problem (=1) 
   
-0.04965 
(0.06441) 
0.9515621 
    Opinion similarity 
   
0.25565 **** 
(0.03564)  
1.2913030 
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    Leisure time - rest 
   
0.16421**** 
(0.03034)  
1.1784674 
    Leisure time - learn 
   
0.10308 **** 
(0.03020)  
1.1085805 
Control variables 
     
Gender - male (reference) 
 
--- --- --- --- 
    Gender - female 
 
-0.09152 * 
(0.05386) 
0.9125398 
-0.11107 ** 
(0.05533)  
0.8948784 
Age group 1 - [18, 33) (reference) 
 
--- --- --- --- 
    Age group 2 - [33,48) 
 
0.22873 *** 
(0.07594) 
1.2570085 
0.25774 **** 
(0.07818) 
1.2940018 
    Age group 3 - [48,64) 
 
0.45476 **** 
(0.07973) 
1.5757900 
0.41945 **** 
0.08227  
1.5211211 
    Age group 4 - [64,96] 
 
0.61366 **** 
(0.09643) 
1.8471799 
0.48254 **** 
(0.09903)  
1.6201797 
    Social class at 14 years old 
 
-0.03726 ** 
(0.01565) 
0.9634208 
-0.06551 **** 
(0.01610)  
0.9365935 
Highest education - lower than Elementary 
education (reference)  
--- --- --- --- 
Highest education – Elementary education 
 
-0.01549 
(0.09850) 
0.9846276 
-0.06640 
0.10072 
0.9357604 
Highest education – Secondary education 
 
-0.18271 * 
(0.09680) 
0.8330114 
-0.15954 
0.10045 
0.8525326 
Highest education – Tertiary education 
 
-0.05898 
(0.12054) 
0.9427233 
-0.06008 
0.12948 
0.9416937 
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    Mandarin level 
 
0.02316 
0.03215 
1.0234328 
0.06773 ** 
(0.03317)  
1.0700758 
    Happiness 
 
0.46195 **** 
0.03225 
1.5871692 
0.19682 **** 
(0.03425)  
1.2175275 
    Precepts ―choice phobia‖ 
 
0.06081 * 
(0.03149) 
1.0626935 
0.10648 **** 
(0.03235)  
1.1123564 
Number of iterations 1 5 
 
5 
 
Pseudo R square 
     
    MacFadden
1
 --- 0.021487 
 
0.07620806 
 
    Cox & Snell
2
 --- 0.05317206 
 
0.1761646 
 
    Negelkerke
3
 --- 0.05317206 
 
0.1761646 
 
Log-likelihood -6615.184 -6473.044 
 
-6111.054 
 
Predictive capability 0.4952912 0.5024025 
 
0.5414184 
 
Name of linear predictors  logit(P[Y≥2]), logit(P[Y≥3]), logit(P[Y≥4]), logit(P[Y≥5]) 
Number of observations 5203 
Data source: CGSS 2013. Significance code: 0~0.001 ****; 0.001~0.01***; 0.01~0.05**; 0.05~0.1*. Ordered logit regressions are implemented with R package 
VGAM. (Yee, 2017) For more knowledge of using R for econometric analysis, see, e.g., Heiss, 2016.
                                                             
1 𝑅𝑀𝑎𝑐𝐹𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑛
2 = 1 − ln 𝐿(𝑀𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 ) ln 𝐿(𝑀𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 )  
2 𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑥&𝑆𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑙
2 = 1 −  𝐿(𝑀𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ) 𝐿(𝑀𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 )  
2 𝑁  
3 𝑅𝑁𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑙𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑘𝑒
2 =  1 −  𝐿(𝑀𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ) 𝐿(𝑀𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 )  
2 𝑁   1 − 𝐿(𝑀𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 )
2 𝑁    
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Table 4. Likelihood ratio test – general trust. 
    Degree of freedom Log likelihood 
Difference of 
Degree of freedom 
Chi square Pr (Chi square) 
Full model vs. null model 
full model 20790 -6111.1 --- --- --- 
null model 20808 -6615.2 18 1008.3 < 2.2e-16 **** 
Control model vs. null model 
control model 20797 -6473.0 --- --- --- 
null model 20808 -6615.2 11 284.28 < 2.2e-16 **** 
Full model vs. control model 
full model 20790 -6111.1 --- --- --- 
control model 20797 -6473.0 7 723.98 < 2.2e-16 **** 
Significance code: 0~0.001 ****; 0.001~0.01***; 0.01~0.05**; 0.05~0.1*. Implemented using R package VGAM. (Yee, 2017) 
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4 Discussion: general trust vs. trust in strangers 
When talking about general trust, scholars want to know how ―general‖ general trust is, namely 
the radius of general trust. An argument is that it is just because general trust exceeds family, 
kinship and friends and permeates into strangers general trust can become ―general‖. Then, to 
which degree does general trust relates to trust in strangers? Can those that can explain general 
trust also explain trust in strangers? If yes, to what degree?  
CGSS 2013 Questionnaire B also contains a question about trust in strangers. (CGSS 2013, 
Questionnaire B) Table 5 is a contingency table between general trust and trust in strangers at each 
level. Pearson correlation coefficient between general trust and trust in strangers is about 0.31. 
Table 6 presents ordered logit regressions of trust in strangers on independent variables that are 
the same with those of ordered logit regressions of general trust shown in Table 5. Let‘s compare 
the full model in Table 4 and Table 5. 
Control variables In the full model in Table 6, female still has a negative impact, but not as 
significant as that in Table 5. What is surprising is that the positive impact of age groups gets not 
significant any more in contrast to Table 4. The impact of subjective social class at 14 years old 
changes from negative in Table 5 to positive in Table 6, still significant but not that strongly. The 
impact of current education level gets a little bit more complicated. In the full model in Table 6, as 
to current education level, compared with the category of lower than elementary education, 
elementary education and secondary education have significant negative impact on trust in 
strangers, even at different significance level, while tertiary education have a positive but not 
significant impact on trust in strangers. Mandarin level still has a significant positive impact in 
Table 5, the same with that in Table 6. Also precepts ―choice phobia‖ keeps its significant positive 
impact. However, the impact of happiness on trust in strangers in Table 5 becomes both negative 
and insignificant, in contrast to that in Table 6.     
Core explanatory variables In Table 6, taken advantage has a negative impact on trust in strangers, 
but not as significant as in Table 5. Fairness and moral satisfaction still have a strongly significant 
positive impact on trust in strangers. In contrast to impact on general trust in Table 5, the negative 
impact public security problem on trust in strangers becomes much more significant in Table 6. 
Even thought the positive impact of opinion similarity in Table 6 is not as strong as in Table 5, it is 
still very significant. As to leisure time, the significant impact of leisure time in Table 5 change 
from positive to negative in Table 6, with a less significant influence, while the significant positive 
impact of leisure time for learning keeps consistent more or less in Table 5 and Table 6. For trust 
in strangers, moral satisfaction contributes to the change of log odds most. Fairness comes closely 
after moral satisfaction. Then is public security problem. 
Likelihood ratio tests Likelihood ratio tests are also implemented for null model vs. control model, 
null model vs. full model, and control model vs. full model respectively when dependent variable 
is trust in strangers. (See Table 7) The three tests are all significant at significance level of 0.001. 
Thus, the whole model holds. 
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In general, what are used to explain general trust in this paper can also explain trust in strangers. 
However, even though most of the core explanatory variables in Table 6 have the same impact 
direction and significance overall, the full model in Table 6 only improve the predictive capability 
by 0.4 percentage compared with the control model in Table 6. The predictive capability of the full 
model in Table 6 is only about 45.3%. So, general trust to a large extend does not refers to trust in 
strangers at least for China. 
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Table 5. Contingency table: general trust vs. trust in strangers. 
    
Trust in strangers 
  
   
Strongly distrust (=1) Distrust (=2) Fair (=3) Trust (=4) Strongly trust (=5) 
  
Sum 393 2333 1520 916 41 
General trust Strongly disagree (=1) 200 91 73 32 3 1 
 
Disagree (=2) 1304 102 852 267 79 4 
 
Neither (=3) 845 43 352 371 74 5 
 
Agree (=4) 2577 119 970 787 693 8 
 
Strongly agree (=5) 277 38 86 63 67 23 
Data source: CGSS 2013. N=5203. 
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Table 6: Ordered logit regression (Dependent variable: trust in strangers) 
  Null model 
Estimate 
(Std. Error) 
Control model Full model 
  
Estimate 
(Std. Error) 
Exponentiated 
estimate 
Estimate 
(Std. Error) 
Exponentiated 
estimate 
Intercepts 
     
    Intercept 1 
2.50464 **** 
(0.05246) 
1.83095 **** 
(0.20885)  
0.53637 * 
(0.28060)  
    Intercept 2 
-0.09579 **** 
(0.02776) 
-0.79548 **** 
(0.20560)  
-2.17018 **** 
(0.28055)  
    Intercept 3 
-1.48993 **** 
(0.03578) 
-2.20728 **** 
(0.20772)  
-3.63008 **** 
(0.28348)  
    Intercept 4 
-4.83551 **** 
(0.15679) 
-5.56175 **** 
(0.25821)  
-7.02357 **** 
(0.32313)  
Core explanatory variables 
     
    Taken advantage 
   
-0.05723 ** 
(0.02831) 
0.9443786 
    Fairness 
   
0.26958 **** 
(0.02800) 
1.3094188 
    Moral satisfaction 
   
0.27904 **** 
(0.03256) 
1.3218666 
    Public security problem (=0, reference) 
   
--- --- 
    Public security problem (=1) 
   
-0.15309 ** 
(0.06241) 
0.8580534 
    Opinion similarity 
   
0.10050 *** 
(0.03450) 
1.1057279 
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    Leisure time - rest 
   
-0.06328 ** 
(0.02937) 
0.9386773 
    Leisure time - learn 
   
0.08734 *** 
(0.02905) 
1.0912657 
Control variables 
     
Gender - male (reference) 
 
--- --- --- --- 
    Gender - female 
 
-0.11708 ** 
(0.05288) 
0.8895164 
-0.09271 * 
(0.05350) 
0.9114547 
Age group 1 - [18, 33) (reference) 
 
--- --- --- --- 
    Age group 2 - [33,48) 
 
-0.06630 
(0.07529) 
0.9358479 
-0.07186 
(0.07639) 
0.9306642 
    Age group 3 - [48,64) 
 
-0.05095 
(0.07857) 
0.9503238 
-0.08043 
(0.07998) 
0.9227230 
    Age group 4 - [64,96] 
 
0.10496 
(0.09362) 
1.1106658 
0.06285 
(0.09511) 
1.0648680 
    Social class at 14 years old 
 
0.04607 *** 
(0.01533) 
1.0471500 
0.03803 ** 
(0.01554) 
1.0387658 
Highest education - lower than Elementary 
education (reference)  
--- --- --- --- 
Highest education – Elementary education 
 
-0.20406 ** 
(0.09532) 
0.8154096 
-0.21048 ** 
(0.09608) 
0.8101970 
Highest education – Secondary education 
 
-0.21531 ** 
(0.09390) 
0.8062943 
-0.16256 * 
(0.09619) 
0.8499691 
Highest education – Tertiary education 
 
0.12333 
(0.11697) 
1.1312624 
0.16490 
(0.12424) 
1.1792761 
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    Mandarin level 
 
0.05662 * 
(0.03149) 
1.0582487 
0.08292 *** 
(0.03198) 
1.0864514 
    Happiness 
 
0.12772 **** 
(0.03150) 
1.1362403 
-0.01461 
(0.03352) 
0.9854980 
    Precepts ―choice phobia‖ 
 
0.02789 
(0.03081) 
1.0282862 
0.04239 
(0.03115) 
1.0433027 
Number of iterations 1 4 
 
5 
 
Pseudo R square 
     
    MacFadden --- 0.006568229 
 
0.02676166 
 
    Cox & Snell --- 0.01639264 
 
0.06512628 
 
    Negelkerke --- 0.01639264 
 
0.06512628 
 
Log-likelihood -6546.49 -6503.492 
 
-6371.296 
 
Predictive capability 0.4483952 0.4489717 
 
0.4532001 
 
Name of linear predictors  logit(P[Y≥2]), logit(P[Y≥3]), logit(P[Y≥4]), logit(P[Y≥5]) 
Number of observations 5203 
Data source: CGSS 2013. Significance code: 0~0.001 ****; 0.001~0.01***; 0.01~0.05**; 0.05~0.1*. Ordered logit regressions are implemented with R package 
VGAM. (Yee, 2017)
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Table 7. Likelihood ratio test – trust in strangers. 
    Degree of freedom Log likelihood 
Difference of 
Degree of freedom 
Chi square Pr ( Chi square) 
Full model vs. null model 
full model 20790 -6371.3 --- --- --- 
null model 20808 -6546.5 18 350.39 < 2.2e-16 **** 
Control model vs. null model 
control model 20797 -6503.5 --- --- --- 
null model 20808 -6546.5 11 85.998 1.01e-13 **** 
Full model vs. control model 
full model 20790 -6371.3 --- --- --- 
control model 20797 -6503.5 7 264.39 < 2.2e-16 **** 
Significance code: 0~0.001 ****; 0.001~0.01***; 0.01~0.05**; 0.05~0.1*. Implemented with R package VGAM. (Yee, 2017) 
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5 Conclusions 
The main aim of this paper is to quantitatively explore the determinants of general trust. This 
paper from a perspective of original institutional economics provides a theoretical frame first and 
then proposes three hypotheses. Subsequently, CGSS 2013 dataset is used to implement ordered 
logit regression of general trust on its possible determinants. As to core explanatory variables, it is 
found that fairness, moral satisfaction, opinion similarity, leisure time for rest and leisure time for 
learning have significant a positive impact on general trust, while taken advantage has a 
significant negative impact on general trust. However, even though public security problem has a 
negative impact on general trust, its impact is not significant. What is more, these core explanatory 
variables improve predictive capability by 4 percent.  
Additionally, this paper also compares general trust and trust in strangers under same dataset by 
doing ordered logit regressions of trust in strangers on the same independent variable of general 
trust. It is found that taken advantage, fairness, moral satisfaction, opinion similarity, leisure time 
for learning still have significant impact on trust in strangers, with consistent impact directions 
with their impacts on general trust. What is different is that it is fairness that has the biggest 
influence on general trust, while it is moral satisfaction that has the biggest influence on trust in 
strangers. What is noticeable is that the negative impact of public security problem is not 
significant on general trust, but gets significant on trust in strangers. The impact of leisure time for 
rest is significant both for general trust and trust in strangers, but with opposite directions. In 
addition, the same core explanatory variables to a quite different degree improve the predictive 
capability in the general-trust model and in the trust-strangers model.  
It should be noted that even though this paper from three aspects explores what affects general 
trust, not every aspect is suitable for policy implication. Actually, only the first aspect, namely 
violating norms of conduct, is appropriate for policy implication. For example, designing more 
fair mechanisms, educating people to behave morally more, providing more secure public 
environment, and strengthening legislation and law-enforcement are among the alternatives to 
improve general trust, as well as trust in strangers. 
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Appendix A: Selected questions from CGSS 2013 Questionnaire B.
1
 
Section A: 
A2. Gender 
Male …… 1 
Female …… 2 
A3. What is your birth date? 
____Year__Month__Day 
A31 In the last year, did you often do the things below in your leisure time? 
 Never Seldom Sometimes Often Very 
frequently 
1. Social 
activities 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Rest and 
relax 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Learn 1 2 3 4 5 
A33. Generally speaking, do you agree that most people can be trusted in this society? 
Strongly disagree …… 1 
Disagree …… 2 
Neither …… 3 
Agree …… 4 
Strongly agree …… 5 
A34. In general, do you agree that in this society others would try to take advantage of you if you 
are not careful enough? 
Strongly disagree …… 1 
Disagree …… 2 
Neither …… 3 
                                                             
1 Author‘s own translation. Original questionnaire is in Chinese. 
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Agree …… 4 
Strongly agree …… 5 
A35. Generally speaking, do you think the current society is fair? 
Completely unfair …… 1 
Unfair …… 2 
Neither …. 3 
Fair …. 4 
Completely fair …… 5 
A36. In general, do you think you are living happily? 
Very unhappy …… 1 
Unhappy …… 2 
Neither …… 3 
Happy …… 4 
Very happy …… 5 
A43. In our society, some people are on upper class of the society while some are on lower class. 
[…] The highest score ‗10‘ represents the highest class while the lowest score ‗1‘ refers to the 
lowest class.  
    …… 
A43c. Which class do you think your will be at 10 years later? 
A43d. Which class do you think your family was at when you were 14 years old? 
A49. How good do you think your mandarin listening? 
Completely cannot understand …... 1 
Poor …… 2 
Fair …… 3 
Good …… 4 
Very good …… 5 
A50. How good do you think your mandarin speaking? 
Completely cannot speak …... 1 
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Poor …… 2 
Fair …… 3 
Good …… 4 
Very good …… 5 
Section B: 
B3. Do you agree with the statement that ―It is very hard for me to choose what precepts to 
follow.‖ 
Strongly disagree …… 1 
Disagree …… 2 
Neither …… 3 
Agree …… 4 
Strongly agree …… 5 
B4. According to your general impression, how often do you hold the same opinions and views on 
some important things with the public? 
Very rarely …… 1 
Rarely …… 2 
Average …… 3 
Frequently …… 4 
Very frequently …… 5 
B6. Generally speaking, do you trust strangers in current society? 
Strongly distrust …… 1 
Distrust …… 2 
Neither …… 3 
Trust …… 4 
Strongly trust …… 5 
B10. In the social problems below, which one do you think is the most prior to be settled? 
 ……  
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4. Public security problem.  
…… 
1. The first to be settled  
2. The second to be settled  
3. The third to be settled  
Section D: 
D1. To what degree are you satisfied with the moral status in our country? 
Very satisfied …… 1 
Satisfied …… 2 
Neither …… 3 
Dissatisfied …… 4 
Very dissatisfied …… 5 
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